I think I'm going to wander around in the dark a little here, because I'm bored and figure it couldn't really hurt. I'm just an (extremely) amateur (student) mathematician/computer scientist. Can't guarantee I'll say anything smart at all. Don't exactly have a reputation to worry about here so I'll have a shot. I'll warn you though, I'm going to be pretty finicky and it might be annoying. Oh and I will probably end up repeating someone, so I'm sorry.
First of all, I'm going to be taking MD's side when it comes to the use of "real". I poked around on Wikipedia -- I think what we're talking about is
modal realism, and one of the main tenets is that "actual" is referential (edit: not sure if this is the word I'm looking for but I hope you understand), similar to "here" and "now", describing the world that the speaker experiences. I'm wondering: if speaker A in world X says "I'm here" and speaker B in world Y says "I'm here", then neither of them are wrong but the
here of speaker A is meaningless to speaker B, yes? That's the feeling I get, anyway. So if speaker A in world X says "This world is real" and speaker B in world Y says "This world is real" ... what's different about this situation? Because speaker A is not in world Y, world Y is inherently
unreal to em. And immediately I have reservations about similar claims to
existence, but I'm not sure how to frame them.
A lack of assumption that other worlds exist would mean being open to the idea, but not assuming it is true. Since "only one world exists" is not necessarily true, it's an assumption.
Well, we have proof that at least one world exists. I find myself drawn to make an analogy with theism, though it may be woefully misinformed. I am an agnostic atheist and
act as if zero gods exist. My claim isn't exactly baseless: I feel like we have plenty of evidence to suggest that our world is godless. Similarly, I have plenty of evidence to suggest that this world exists, so I
act as if one world exists. My previous paragraph made it clear I have reservations about existence and actuality. The "existence" of other worlds by definition means they can't affect me in any way, so I feel safe in saying that there is no harm in
acting as if there is only one world. It's not exactly an assumption because it's not baseless, and even if other worlds
did exist, it wouldn't make any difference. I don't think that this saves me from making an "assumption" and I think you'll agree with me on that point, but I think that it does no harm to the one world argument. I'm still "open to the idea" but the very idea is meaningless because the worlds are necessarily separated. I think a very similar proposition was stated earlier in the thread. Phew, I hope some of that is at all digestible. Please be picky and point out the likely numerous problems with my jabber.
To be clear, Possible Worlds Theory assumes that other worlds exists, but I do not assume Possible Worlds Theory is true. Now then, as I said before, possible worlds theory makes a new assumption (other worlds exist) in order to explain something that wasn't explained before (why worlds exist in the first place). That is an okay thing to do.
I don't understand. I must admit I didn't digest very completely the Wikipedia article, but how does it explain why worlds exist? These possible worlds are basically devices to explain probability (among other things), right? So worlds exist to make up for possibilities in other worlds? But where does it all start? What world first had a (unfamiliar jargon coming through!) probability distribution that needed another world to explain it? Bah that's probably missing the point. In any case, it seems to open up many more questions than it actually answers. I don't know. I must admit I don't understand quantum mechanics as much as I'd like to. Please clarify all of this for me.
Why do you limit objective truth to what can be known from our own world? Nothing can be known in the first place.
It seems to me that that is all that would be actually meaningful to us. And I don't really understand what you mean there. Like, "we cannot with absolute certainty say that
x is true?"
Falsifiability is not some Holy Grail of truth. Perhaps knowledge, but not truth. Do you understand this concept or do I need to show it to you?
Can you show it to me, please? I have always closely correlated knowledge with truth and afaict the scientific method rests on falsifiability, and while I understand that it's not infallible, it seems pretty damn good to me.
Eventually you have to ask yourself, "why did something end up existing at all", because nothing ever had to. Seriously, why are people so enamored by Curiosity Stoppers?
I don't understand. Are you saying that possible worlds somehow answers this question? (And I think you're being a little condescending! Is "I don't know" a curiosity stopper? Because that's how I've always answered
why?.)
Alright, I'm about to look
severely naïve, so get ready.
Just because you can't possibly contain the entirety of the details of all possible worlds doesn't mean it doesn't have a Highest Truth.
Something about this doesn't sit well with me. If a dataset that contains perfectly the details of all possible worlds isn't
coherent in the sense that it can't be contained entirely (that's what you seem to suggest -- please correct me if I am mistaken), how can you claim that it
does have a Highest Truth? (Aside: I'm a bit wary of this "Highest Truth" because it feels like Platonism to me and I am not a Platonist. Again please clarify.) I am kind of struggling to think of something that this describes ... we're saying that these worlds are infinite in number, right? So the sum of their descriptions are probably infinite as well ... with exception of this Highest Truth. Sorry, I guess the entire concept is evading me.
It's Highest Truth is so attractive because of its simplicity: if it can exist, it does. It's a simple algorithm, and once you know how to use it you can determine whether any given state of affairs exists or not.
How do we determine if something can exist? Is this what you mean by "once you know how to use it"?
It's like the graph of y = x^2. No matter how many times you plug in a new value to find a point that exists, you are no closer to having omniscient knowledge of the parabola. The parabola is infinite to either side of a point, and infinite in between any two points. That doesn't stop it from existing. It still has a Highest Truth: y = x^2.
Naïvete incoming! Feels like Platonism again. Is that inherent to this theory? Because it's something I very much struggle to accept. In the context of this example, I gotta say that I am a humanist when it comes to mathematics. I don't believe there is "y = x^2" form hanging out somewhere that is invoked whenever we talk about parabolas. I think "y = x^2" is meaningless (or at least useless) outside of the context of our mathematical system and I'd be hard pressed to explain the concept without centuries of tradition behind me. Well, it does seem true to me (in context) that "y = x^2" describes an infinite object, the parabola, but the question of the existence of an infinite number of worlds, with a presumably infinitely complex description of the total, seems very different to the definition of a parabola. I wouldn't comfortably equate the two, I guess.
Sorry this is probably all incoherent!! But I'd appreciate any effort to look through it and advise me. (Incidentally, any LessWrong articles that talk about this?)