Where are you getting this from? All we've been told is that he thinks God is dark matter, we haven't been told how he arrived at the conclusion.
I will concede this; however, the people I
have seen claiming things like that generally say it because, as I said, they think it's a poignant conclusion about the universe, not because they have observed evidence for it.
"I think God is dark matter."
"I know God exists."
I fail to see how both statements are not equally invalid.
What? These are completely different statements by their very nature; "I think God is dark matter" is purely a statement about your state of mind, whereas "I know God exists" is an (implicit) statement of fact about the world. "I know God exists" means "I have observed evidence that God exists"; this is a statement of exactly the same type as the statements found in scientific journals or textbooks. And while neither is scientific evidence in the sense of hard data, it is Bayesian evidence: evidence in the sense that if you were to estimate the probability of God existing based on everything you know, first before Jesus makes that claim and then after, the probability would be ever so slightly different.
It did confuse me and the link confused me even more.
Too bad. It's really quite interesting and
very enlightening; Bayes' Theorem is one of those facts of statistics that humans really don't have any instinctual sense of but that actually lies at the core of the objective definition of evidence. I really recommend you read the whole page sometime (yes, it's very long, but it's worth it; I'm presuming here you quit in confusion before you actually read the whole thing).
I almost had it until you told me the textbook Jesus analogy was different from Jesus.
What's confusing about "It's like Jesus, except more reliable because it's different in these two ways"?
I'm probably wrong because I failed to understand the whole theorem thing (in fairness though, using a mammography and statistics are not the best way to make an analogy, nor is make the analogy and explaining the analogy at the same time) but I still fail to see why Jesus's claim is any more probable than the dark matter guy's claim.
Bayes' Theorem is quite hard to explain adequately with an analogy that does not involve statistics, because it is a statistical theorem and a quite unintuitive one at that. But I will make an attempt to explain the conclusion, anyway.
Basically. Imagine we take all possible worlds and split them into worlds in which Jesus is exactly right and worlds in which Jesus is not exactly right. Obviously there will be much more of the latter kind of world, but that doesn't matter here.
If we take just the worlds in which Jesus
is exactly right and find the probability for any given such world that Jesus existed and said what he said, this probability will probably be quite high. This is because in these worlds Jesus is exactly right, including such claims as that God came to earth (or sent his son, or some nebulous mix of both) as Jesus to tell people about God, which presumably means that's what he's going to do.
Meanwhile, if we take just the (astronomically more numerous, but again, that doesn't matter) worlds in which Jesus is
not exactly right and find the probability for any given such world that Jesus existed and said what he said, that probability is definitely something lower than the probability for the other worlds; it's just the probability of somebody named Jesus being alive at this time and for any of a number of reasons deciding to make these claims even though in these worlds they are in fact false. Obviously there are plenty of ways this can happen, but the overall probability of it is quite low.
Bayes' Theorem tells us that
just the fact these two probabilities are different, and that the former is higher, means that Jesus making his claims is evidence in his claims' favor. You don't need to understand the math or properly why, but this is the case and that's a mathematically proven fact. Basically, if we now put all the worlds together again and instead split them into worlds in which Jesus makes those claims and worlds in which he doesn't, there will be a greater proportion of worlds in which Jesus is right among the worlds in which Jesus made those claims than among the worlds in which Jesus didn't make those claims. The proportion will of course be very low in both cases, but still greater in the former than in the latter.
This sounds like an affirming the consequent fallacy (if p then q; q; therefore p). That's because calling it a logical fallacy doesn't tell the whole story: it is true that it is incorrect to deduce from these premises that p
must be true, but once we're dealing with probabilities instead of simply truth or falsehood, then q is indeed evidence for p.
For instance: let's assume if it rains, the streets become wet. We cannot
logically deduce that it has rained if the streets are wet; that is what the fallacy means.
However, the streets being wet is
Bayesian evidence that it has rained. Imagine you're inside your house with the curtains drawn and estimate, without having looked outside, the probability that it has recently rained. Now you walk outside and see that the streets are wet. It is perfectly reasonable for you now to adjust your probability estimate in favor of it having rained: it's not a certainty, since the streets might have gotten wet another way, but the fact the streets do get wet when it rains means you still have more reason to suspect it may have been raining than you did before you saw that the streets were wet.
However, Bayes' Theorem
also tells us that the
prior probability is extremely important in this regard. In this example, your adjustment of the probability that it has rained should depend very heavily on the general probability of rain: if rain is very frequent, then wet streets shift your estimate up significantly, whereas if it almost never rains, the adjustment will be very slight, though it will still be present.
When we're dealing with Jesus, what is happening is basically that it almost never rains: the prior probability that Jesus is right is
extremely low, and therefore, even though Jesus saying so is Bayesian evidence for his being right, the effects are almost undetectable and it is still perfectly reasonable to discard the possibility. What I'm getting at (and Eloi, if in less technical terms) is that the fact remains that it
is Bayesian evidence.
Somebody claiming they
knew that God was dark matter would also be Bayesian evidence for that proposition (similarly feeble, of course). However, like I said, I find it extremely unlikely that this person made any such claim. Odds are, yet again, they posited it as a poignant conclusion rather than a statement of fact, and that sort of conclusion is
not Bayesian evidence, because if we took all possible worlds in which God actually was dark matter and all possible worlds in which he wasn't, the proportion of universes in which they think God being dark matter is poignant would be the same.
EDIT:
Bachuru pretty much took the words out of my mouth, but I do believe teh ebil snorlax just doesn't want to understand so thus they don't try. My personal theory, feel free to prove me wrong.
Do correct me if I'm wrong, but somehow I find myself really doubting you had any idea about Bayes' Theorem before you read my post, even if you had an intuitive sense that there was a difference between Jesus and the dark matter guy. Latching onto my post as if this was all exactly what you were going to say while acting condescending to Teh Ebil Snorlax for being confused by it is not good debating etiquette.